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SECRECY LOGIC: PROTOALGEBRAIC
S-SECRECY LOGICS
A b s t r a c t. In recent work the notion of a secrecy logicS over a
given deductive system S was introduced. Secrecy logics capture
the essential features of structures that are used in performing
secrecy-preserving reasoning in practical applications. More pre-
cisely, they model knowledge bases that consist of information,
part of which is considered known to the user and part of which
is to remain secret from the user. S-secrecy structures serve as
the models of secrecy logics. Several of the universal algebraic and
model theoretic properties of the class of S-secrecy structures of a
given S-secrecy logic have already been studied. In this paper, our
goal is to show how techniques from the theory of abstract alge-
braic logic may be used to analyze the structure of a secrecy logic
and draw conclusions about its algebraic character. In particular,
the notion of a protoalgebraic S-secrecy logic is introduced and
several characterizing properties are provided. The relationship
between protoalgebraic S-secrecy logics and the protoalgebraicity
of their underlying deductive systems is also investigated.
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.1 Introduction
In several older and recent works on the security of deductive databases and
knowledge bases, secrecy-preserving reasoning is at the forefront of inves-
tigations. For instance, Sicherman, de Jonge and van de Riet [16] employ
logical censors to either allow or refuse answering a query posed against
a complete database with the goal of answering honestly as many queries
as possible while at the same time protecting secrets. Bonatti, Kraus and
Subrahmanian [9] introduce databases that consist of two parts: in the first
part, one finds stored all the object information about the “outside world”
whereas, in the second, a multi-modal logic is used to express assumptions
about the user’s beliefs concerning the world. Modalities are also used to
express and reason about secrets that the database is assumed to conceal
from the users. The framework is able to cope with both complete and
incomplete databases, where, in the latter, some information is assumed to
be unknown. More recently, in a series of papers, Biskup [2] and Biskup
and Bonatti [3, 4, 5] deal with the same problem and investigate the re-
lationship of various responding policies under a variety of assumptions
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the techniques of lying and
refusal. Again the major goal is to provide as much information as possible
to a querying agent while at the same time avoiding disclosure of secret
or sensitive information. Similar problems have been investigated in the
context of knowledge bases that are assumed to be expressed in some de-
scription logic or other decidable fragment of first-order logic in various
other works (see, e.g., [17, 1, 10, 11, 18]).
In recent work introduced by the author [19], the common features of all
these approaches were abstracted with the goal of initiating an investigation
into the structure of the underlying logical systems and their algebraic and
model-theoretic properties. A basic assumption is that reasoning is taking
place over a fixed given sentential logic or deductive system S = 〈L,`S〉.
This allows many of the techniques of universal algebra, model theory and
abstract algebraic logic to be employed to study the ensuing models. Apart
from the underlying logic, in the application of the framework to perform
reasoning, there is always given a knowledge base K containing known
facts about the “world”. Moreover, part of the information contained in
K, denoted by B, is considered to be known to the user, either because
it constitutes background information or because the user that queries the
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knowledge base is not assumed to be completely uninformed about the state
of the world. Finally, part of what is true in the knowledge base constitutes
sensitive information that the knowledge base is supposed to keep secret
from the user. Since the user is also reasoning and deducing information
from the information that he has available, it is a basic assumption of the
framework that both K and B are S-theories. Furthermore, since the user
is not supposed to consider true any false piece of information, we have that
B ⊆ K and, since the secret part S is assumed to be true in the knowledge
base, we have S ⊆ K. For secrecy-preserving reasoning to be feasible, it
is obvious that the user must neither know nor be able to deduce at the
beginning any secret information, i.e., it must be the case that B ∩ S = ∅.
In conclusion, given the underlying deductive system S, an S-secrecy logic
is a quadruple S = 〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉, where FmL(V ) is the free algebra
of formulas over the language L, K and B are S-theories, with B ⊆ K, and
S is a subset of K that is disjoint from B.
According to the model-theory of first-order logic, the natural models
of an S-secrecy logic are S-secrecy structures [19]. These are tuples A =
〈A,KA, BA, SA〉, where A is an L-algebra, KA and BA are S-filters on
A, with BA ⊆ KA and SA ⊆ KA, such that SA ∩ BA = ∅. The filters
KA and BA are the knowledge and the browsable filters of the secrecy
structure, respectively, and SA is the secrecy set of the secrecy structure.
These structures and many of the universal algebraic and model theoretic
properties of their classes were investigated in [19]. In this paper, we initiate
a study of the S-secrecy logics themselves from an abstract algebraic logic
perspective.
In Section 2, the formal definition of an S-secrecy logic is introduced.
We also define the notion of a safe theory of an S-secrecy logic. Intuitively,
a safe theory is a theory that consists of positive answers to queries posed
against the knowledge base and that does not jeopardize secrecy. Not all
answers are assumed to be truthful. In fact, it may be necessary on occasion
to lie in order to protect secrets. The order-theoretic structure of the set
of safe theories of a secrecy logic is examined and a consequence relation
is defined based on these theories. The unfortunate characteristic is that
this new logic may not be structural. It is structural only with respect to a
special kind of substitutions that preserve the theories and the secrecy set
defining the secrecy logic. These are termed secrecy substitutions.
In Section 3, drawing from the theory of abstract algebraic logic, we
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introduce Leibniz congruences for secrecy logics. A Leibniz congruence of
a secrecy logic is the largest congruence on the underlying formula algebra
that is compatible with each of the theories and the secrecy set of the secrecy
logic. This construction gives rise to a Leibniz operator that associates with
each safe theory its Leibniz congruence. The notion of a protoalgebraic logic
is also introduced in this section. It is defined exactly as in the theory of
abstract algebraic logic, except that the entailment used is with reference
to the safe theories and not all original theories of the underlying deductive
system. It is shown that, in this setting as well, protoalgebraic secrecy
logics are characterized by the monotonicity of the new Leibniz operator
on the safe theories of the logic. By providing a characterization of Leibniz
congruences, we are able to show that, if a deductive system S is protoal-
gebraic in the ordinary sense of abstract algebraic logic, then all S-secrecy
logics must also be protoalgebraic. On the other hand, a counterexample
is provided for the converse statement. There are protoalgebraic secrecy
logics with non protoalgebraic underlying deductive systems. Intuitively,
this phenomenon is anticipated because the choice of the theories and of the
secrecy set that define the secrecy logic may drastically reduce the amount
of safe theories as compared to the totality of theories of the underlying
deductive system. And protoalgebraicity at this level requires looking only
at this smaller set of theories.
Section 4 provides an attempt to introduce implication systems. In
the ordinary theory of protoalgebraic deductive systems, it is proven that
protoalgebraicity is equivalent to the existence of implication systems, i.e.,
sets of formulas P (x, y) in two variables x, y, such that P (φ, φ) are axioms
of the logic and φ together with P (φ,ψ) imply ψ over the given logic, i.e., P
acts collectively as the implication connective of classical logic with respect
to modus ponens (see, e.g., Theorem 1.1.3 of [12]). The problem that we
face when trying to carry this result over to the secrecy setting is that safe
theories are not closed under inverse substitutions and, as a result, secrecy
logics fail in general to be structural. Structurality is key in proving this
result in abstract algebraic logic. We provide only a partial analog of this
result under rather restrictive hypotheses that we do not expect to hold in
many settings of practical interest. It is still open if some other method of
proof or some appropriate modification of the notion exists that can relax
these conditions and provide a more general version in the secrecy setting.
In Section 5 we recall the notion of an S-secrecy structure from [19].
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The notion of a safe or secrecy filter is introduced and that of a matrix of
a secrecy logic. Safe filters correspond to safe theories in much the same
way as filters on arbitrary algebras correspond to theories on the formula
algebra in the study of deductive systems. Similarly with that framework,
the notion of a Leibniz congruence may be extended to cover congruences
on arbitrary algebras that are associated with given secrecy filters. We
conclude the section by providing an analog of the characterization of pro-
toalgebraic logics via the monotonicity of the associated Leibniz operators
on the filters of every algebra. The characterization here is slightly differ-
ent. We consider only secrecy structures for which there exists at least one
strict surjective interpretation from the secrecy logic to the structure and
show that the secrecy logic is protoalgebraic iff the new Leibniz operator
is monotone on the collection of secrecy filters on these restricted set of
secrecy structures.
Finally, in the last section of the paper, we draw on the correspondence
property of protoalgebraic logics to provide yet one more characterization
of protoalgebraic secrecy logics. Again, although the general spirit is very
similar, attention is needed to modify the notions involved to take into
account the unique features of secrecy logics. The main result character-
izes protoalgebraic secrecy logics as those that have the modified corre-
spondence property. Another characterization singles out a special class of
models and, starting from strict surjective secrecy homomorphisms estab-
lishes isomorphisms between the lattices of the secrecy filters of the secrecy
structures involved.
.2 S-Secrecy Logic
Given an algebraic (or logical, depending on the point of view) language
type L, let FmL(V ) be the set of all L-terms (or L-formulas) with vari-
ables in a fixed denumerable set V and FmL(V ) the corresponding term
or formula algebra. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be an L-deductive system, i.e., a pair
consisting of a fixed language type L and a finitary and structural conse-
quence relation `L ⊆ P(FmL(V )) × FmL(V ), that is, a relation satisfying
the following properties, for every Γ ∪∆ ∪ {φ,ψ} ⊆ FmL(V ):
1. Γ `S φ, for all φ ∈ Γ,
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2. Γ `S φ implies ∆ `S φ, for all Γ ⊆ ∆,
3. Γ `S φ and ∆ `S ψ, for all ψ ∈ Γ, imply ∆ `S φ,
4. Γ `S φ implies Γ
′ `S φ, for some finite Γ
′ ⊆ Γ,
5. Γ `S φ implies σ(Γ) `S σ(φ), for every endomorphism σ of FmL(V ).
Clearly endomorphisms of FmL(V ) are fully determined by their values on
the variables in V . For this reason, they are also called assignments or
substitutions.
We define next the notion of an S-secrecy logic. S-secrecy logics were
first introduced in [19] and will be the main objects of study in this paper.
Recall, e.g. from [12], that, given a deductive system S = 〈L,`S〉 and an
L-algebra A = 〈A,LA〉, a subset F ⊆ A is called an S-filter on A if,
for all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ FmL(V ), such that Γ `S φ and every homomorphism
h : FmL(V )→ A,
h(Γ) ⊆ F implies h(φ) ∈ F.
The collection of all S-filters on A is denoted by FiSA and forms a com-
plete algebraic lattice under inclusion, denoted FiSA = 〈FiSA,⊆〉. The
collection of S-filters on the formula algebra coincides with the set of S-
theories
ThS = {T ⊆ FmL(V ) : (∀φ ∈ FmL(V ))(T `S φ implies φ ∈ T )}.
It is well-known from the theory of abstract algebraic logic that ThS is
closed under inverse substitutions (due to the structurality of the deductive
system S).
Definition 2.1. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system. A secrecy
logic S over S, or an S-secrecy logic, is a quadruple S = 〈FmL(V ),K,
B, S〉, where
1. K,B ∈ ThS, such that B ⊆ K;
2. S ⊆ K, such that S ∩B = ∅.
K is called the knowledge theory, B the browsable theory and S the
secrect set of S.
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Given an S-secrecy logic S, a substitution h : FmL(V ) → FmL(V )
is called an S-substitution if h(K) ⊆ K, h(B) ⊆ B and h(S) ⊆ S.
It is called a strict S-substitution if K = h−1(K), B = h−1(B) and
S = h−1(S).
Our analysis of S-secrecy logics will rely to a large extent on the no-
tion of a safe theory. Roughly speaking, safe theories constitute sets of
formulas that, when posed as queries by an agent querying the knowledge
base represented by the secrecy logic, may be given a positive answer safely
without jeopardizing the secret status of the set S and without lying on the
browsable theory B, that contains information that the agent is assumed
to already know.
Definition 2.2. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 be a secrecy logic over S. A theory T ∈ ThS is said to
be a safe theory (with respect to) S if B ⊆ T and T ∩S = ∅. We write
SThS = {T ∈ ThS : B ⊆ T and T ∩ S = ∅}.
Note that the definition means that, if T is a safe theory, then all browsable
formulas are contained in T and no secret formula is in T . Since T is a
theory, this also implies that no secret formula may be entailed by T . It is
not difficult to see, using Zorn’s Lemma, that every safe theory is contained
in a maximal safe theory.
Proposition 2.3. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 a secrecy logic over S. Every safe theory T ∈ SThS is
contained in a maximal safe theory.
Proof. Let T ∈ SThS. Consider the set
T = {Q ∈ SThS : T ⊆ Q}
= {Q ∈ ThS : T ⊆ Q and Q ∩ S = ∅}.
This set is nonempty, since T ∈ T. Moreover, it is relatively easy to see
that any chain in T has an upper bound in T, namely the union of all
its members. Thus, by Zorn’s Lemma, T has a maximal element, which,
obviously, contains T . 
One of the most problematic features of the collection SThS, as regards
the analysis of its structure from the abstract algebraic logic point of view,
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is that it is not, in general, invariant under inverse substitutions. Consider,
for instance, a secrecy logic S that contains in its browsable theory B a
propositional variable b and in its secret set S a propositional variable s.
Then, the substitution h that sends s to b and fixes the values of all other
variables does not preserve SThS with respect to S. To see this, it suffices
to notice that h−1(B)∩S 6= ∅, which implies that h−1(B) 6∈ SThS, despite
the fact that B ∈ SThS.
In contrast to this state of affairs, it is an encouraging observation that
SThS is invariant under all S-substitutions.
Proposition 2.4. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 a secrecy logic over S. Then for every S-substitution
h, h−1(SThS) ⊆ SThS.
Proof. Suppose T ∈ SThS. Then T ∈ Th(S), such that B ⊆ T
and T ∩ S = ∅. Then, we have (by standard sentential logic arguments)
that h−1(T ) ∈ ThS and, moreover, B ⊆ h−1(B) ⊆ h−1(T ) and h−1(T ) ∩
h−1(S) = ∅, which, since S ⊆ h−1(S), yields h−1(T ) ∩ S = ∅. Hence
h−1(T ) ∈ SThS. 
According to [15], a complete semilattice is defined to be a poset
L = 〈L, ≤〉, such that, for every nonempty A ⊆ L,
∧
A exists and, for any
directed set D ⊆ L,
∨
D also exists. By the definition of a safe theory, it
is clear that the next proposition holds:
Proposition 2.5. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 a secrecy logic over S. SThS is a complete meet-
subsemilattice of the complete meet-semilattice of all theories of S. More-
over, B is the least element of SThS.
By adjoining to SThS the largest element FmL(V ) of ThS, which, al-
though it is not a safe theory in our sense unless S = ∅, it is used to de-
note inconsistent secrecy reasoning, we obtain a complete lattice STh>S =
〈STh>S,≤〉. This, however, is not a sublattice of the complete algebraic
lattice ThS = 〈ThS,≤〉.
The elements in STh>S may be used to generate a new deductive system
SS as detailed in the following:
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Definition 2.6. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 be a secrecy logic over S. Define SS = 〈L,`S〉 by
setting, for all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ FmL(V ),
Γ `S φ iff, for every T ∈ STh
>S, (Γ ⊆ T implies φ ∈ T ).
We denote by ThSS the collection of all SS-theories, i.e., of all sets
T ⊆ FmL(V ), such that, for all φ ∈ FmL(V ), T `S φ, implies φ ∈ T . It
is not difficult to see that `S is a consequence relation on FmL(V ) that is
S-structural in the sense that, for every S-substitution h, Γ `S φ implies
that h(Γ) `S h(φ), for all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ FmL(V ). These remarks form the
contents of the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 a secrecy logic over S.
1. `S is an S-structural consequence relation;
2. ThSS = STh
>S.
Proof.
1. That `S is a consequence relation is obvious from Definition 2.6.
Suppose that Γ `S φ, h an S-substitution and T ∈ STh
>S, such
that h(Γ) ⊆ T . Then Γ ⊆ h−1(T ) ∈ STh>S, by Proposition 2.4.
Hence, since Γ `S φ, we get that φ ∈ h
−1(T ), i.e., h(φ) ∈ T . This
shows that h(Γ) `S h(φ), whence `S is S-structural.
2. Suppose, first, that T ∈ SThS, i.e., T ∈ ThS, such that B ⊆ T
and T ∩ S = ∅. Let φ ∈ FmL(V ), such that T `S φ. Then, since
T ⊆ T ∈ SThS, we have φ ∈ T . Thus, T is a theory of SS.
Assume, conversely, that T ∈ ThSS. Since, by definition, T =
FmL(V ) ∈ STh
>S, we assume that T 6= FmL(V ). If, for every T
′ ∈
SThS, T 6⊆ T ′, then CS(T ) :=
⋂
{T ′ ∈ STh>S : T ⊆ T ′} = FmL(V ),
which contradicts T 6= FmL(V ). Thus, there exists T
′ ∈ SThS, such
that T ⊆ T ′. Now observe that
T ⊆
⋂
{T ′ ∈ ThS : T ⊆ T ′} ⊆
⋂
{T ′ ∈ SThS : T ⊆ T ′}=CS(T )=T.
Thus, T =
⋂
{T ′ ∈ ThS : T ⊆ T ′} = CS(T ), showing that T ∈ ThS.

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.3 Protoalgebraicity
In the theory of abstract algebraic logic, one of the most important notions,
that plays a crucial role in the classification of logics in a hierarchy reflecting
the strength of their algebraic character, is that of the Leibniz operator [7].
Recall that, given a congruence θ on an L-algebra A = 〈A,LA〉 and a
subset F ⊆ A, θ is said to be compatible with F if, for all a, b ∈ A
〈a, b〉 ∈ θ and a ∈ F imply b ∈ F.
Given a deductive system S = 〈L,`S〉 and a theory T ∈ ThS (or, more
generally, any subset T ⊆ FmL(V )), the Leibniz congruence associated with
T , written ΩS(T ), is the largest congruence on the formula algebra FmL(V )
that is compatible with T . Moreover, given an L-algebra A = 〈A,LA〉
and a filter F ∈ FiSA (or, similarly, any subset F ⊆ A), the Leibniz
congruence of F on A, written ΩA(F ), is the largest congruence on A that
is compatible with F . ΩS and ΩA seen as functions from S-theories and
S-filters, respectively, to congruences are termed the Leibniz operators on
FmL(V ) and A, respectively. Recall from [6] (see also [12, 13, 14]) that
a deductive system S = 〈L,`S〉 is said to be protoalgebraic if, for every
theory T ∈ ThS and all φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), such that 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ ΩS(T ), we have
T, φ a`S T, ψ.
To formulate the notion of protoalgebraic S-secrecy logic, we introduce,
first, the notion of the Leibniz congruence on an S-secrecy logic.
Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S = 〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 an
S-secrecy logic. A congruence on FmL(V ) is called a safe congruence or
a secrecy congruence if it is compatible with each of K,B and S.
Proposition 3.1. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. Then, there exists a largest safe
congruence on the formula algebra FmL(V ).
Proof. As in the proof of the existence of the Leibniz congruence
associated with a given theory of a deductive system in abstract algebraic
logic, one may show that the hypothesis of Zorn’s Lemma holds for the
collection of all safe congruences on FmL(V ). Therefore this set has a
maximal element. However, it is not difficult to see either that, given two
such congruences, their join in the lattice of congruences on FmL(V ) is
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also a safe congruence. Hence there is a unique maximal safe congruence,
which is the largest safe congruence of S. 
Definition 3.2. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. The largest safe congruence on
FmL(V ), which always exists, by Proposition 3.1, is called the Leibniz
congruence of S and denoted by Ω(S).
Next, we introduce the notion of the Leibniz congruence associated with
a safe theory of an S-secrecy logic S. This also gives rise to the notion of
a Leibniz operator on S.
Proposition 3.3. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system, let S =
〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic, and let T ∈ STh
>S. Then, there
exists a largest safe congruence on FmL(V ) that is compatible with T .
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 3.1 and will be
omitted. 
Definition 3.4. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system, let S =
〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic, and let T ∈ STh
>S. The largest
safe congruence on FmL(V ) that is compatible with T , which always ex-
ists, by Proposition 3.3, is called the safe Leibniz congruence of T and
denoted by ΩS(T ). The function ΩS : STh
>S → ConFmL(V ) is called the
safe Leibniz operator of S.
We are now well equipped to define the notion of a protoalgebraic S-
secrecy logic.
Definition 3.5. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. S will be said to be protoalgebraic
if, for all T ∈ STh>S and all φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ),
〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ ΩS(T ) implies T, φ a`S T, ψ.
The following theorem constitutes an analog of the well-known theorem
of abstract algebraic logic characterizing protoalgebraic deductive systems
in terms of the monotonicity of their Leibniz operator [6, 12].
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Theorem 3.6. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. S is protoalgebraic iff, for all
T1, T2 ∈ STh
>S,
T1 ⊆ T2 implies ΩS(T1) ⊆ ΩS(T2).
Proof. Suppose, first, that S is protoalgebraic. Let T1, T2 ∈ STh
>S,
such that T1 ⊆ T2. To see that ΩS(T1) ⊆ ΩS(T2), it suffices to show that
ΩS(T1) is a safe congruence that is compatible with T2, since ΩS(T2) is
the largest such. Since ΩS(T1) is safe, by definition, it suffices to show
its compatibility with T2. Let φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), such that 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ ΩS(T1)
and φ ∈ T2. Then, by protoalgebraicity, T1, φ a`S T1, ψ, whence, since
T1 ⊆ T2, we get T2, φ a`S T2, ψ and, since φ ∈ T2, by Proposition 2.7,
ψ ∈ T2. Hence ΩS(T1) is compatible with T2.
Assume, conversely, that, for every T1, T2 ∈ STh
>S, with T1 ⊆ T2, we
have ΩS(T1) ⊆ ΩS(T2). Let T ∈ STh
>S and φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), such that
〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ ΩS(T ). Consider the safe theory T
′ = CS(T ∪ {φ}). Then, we
have T ⊆ T ′, whence, by hypothesis, ΩS(T ) ⊆ ΩS(T
′) and, since 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈
ΩS(T ), we obtain 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ ΩS(T
′). But φ ∈ T ′, whence, by compatibility,
ψ ∈ T ′, showing that T, φ `S ψ. By symmetry T, φ a`S T, ψ and S is
protoalgebraic. 
Theorem 3.6 may be used to provide clues regarding the relation be-
tween ordinary protoalgebraicity of a deductive system S and protoalge-
braicity of an S-secrecy logic. More specifically, we would like to know
whether there is a connection between a deductive system S being protoal-
gebraic in the ordinary sense and an S-secrecy logic being protoalgebraic
in the sense of Definition 3.5.
Example: Consider any non-protoalgebraic deductive system S that has
a one-element theory, denoted by {>}. Let S = 〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 be the
S-secrecy logic defined by
• K = FmL(V );
• B = {>};
• S = FmL(V )\{>}.
Since STh>S = {{>},FmL(V )} and ΩS({>}) = ΩS(FmL(V )) = Ω(S),
we get that S is protoalgebraic. This example illustrates the fact that
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the protoalgebraicity of S depends crucially on K,B and S, besides the
underlying deductive system S. 
On the other hand, it is true that, if a deductive system S = 〈L,`S〉
is protoalgebraic in the standard sense, then every S-secrecy logic S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 is protoalgebraic. To show this, we prove the following
general proposition relating the Leibniz congruences associated with the
sets K,B and S of S and the safe Leibniz congruence of a safe theory T of
S.
Proposition 3.7. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. Then
1. Ω(S) = ΩS(K) ∩ ΩS(B) ∩ΩS(S).
2. For every safe theory T ∈ SThS, ΩS(T ) = Ω(S) ∩ΩS(T ).
Proof.
1. Since Ω(S) is compatible with each of K,B and S, we have that
Ω(S) ⊆ ΩS(K), Ω(S) ⊆ ΩS(B) and Ω(S) ⊆ ΩS(S). Therefore
Ω(S) ⊆ ΩS(K) ∩ ΩS(B) ∩ ΩS(S). On the other hand, ΩS(K) ∩
ΩS(B) ∩ ΩS(S) is a congruence on FmL(V ), which is compatible
with each of K,B and S. Therefore, by the definition of Ω(S), we
get that ΩS(K) ∩ΩS(B) ∩ ΩS(S) ⊆ Ω(S).
2. Since ΩS(T ) is compatible with each of K,B, S and T , we have that
ΩS(T ) ⊆ ΩS(K), ΩS(T ) ⊆ ΩS(B), ΩS(T ) ⊆ ΩS(S) and ΩS(T ) ⊆
ΩS(T ). Therefore, ΩS(T ) ⊆ Ω(S) ∩ ΩS(T ). On the other hand, it
can be easily verified that Ω(S)∩ΩS(T ) is a congruence on FmL(V ),
that is compatible with each of K,B, S and T . Since, by definition,
ΩS(T ) is the largest such, we get that Ω(S) ∩ ΩS(T ) ⊆ ΩS(T ).

Proposition 3.7 allows us to prove that the protoalgebraicity of S in
the sense of abstract algebraic logic implies the protoalgebraicity of every
S-secrecy logic.
Corollary 3.8. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. If S is protoalgebraic, then S is
protoalgebraic.
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Proof. If S is protoalgebraic, then the Leibniz operator ΩS is monotone
on the lattice of S-theories. Therefore, for every T1, T2 ∈ STh
>(S), such
that T1 ⊆ T2, we obtain
ΩS(T1) = Ω(S) ∩ ΩS(T1) (by Proposition 3.7)
⊆ Ω(S) ∩ ΩS(T2) (by protoalgebraicity)
= ΩS(T2) (by Proposition 3.7),
whence, by Theorem 3.6, S is protoalgebraic. 
.4 Implication Systems
In this section, an attempt is made to relate protoalgebraicity of secrecy log-
ics with existence of an analog of implication systems of abstract algebraic
logic. Recall from the theory of abstract algebraic logic that a deductive
system S is protoalgebraic iff there exists a possibly infinite set P (p, q) of
formulas in two variables p and q, called an implication system, such
that `S P (φ, φ) and φ, P (φ,ψ) `S ψ, for all formulas φ,ψ. We would like
to prove a similar result, if possible, for secrecy logics, i.e., that a secrecy
logic is protoalgebraic iff such a set exists that satisfies the two conditions,
where S is replaced by SS. However, one of the key properties that allows
the proof of the result in the traditional setting is the structurality of S.
And we have already seen that S is only S-structural, but not structural,
in general. Therefore, we are able in this section to carry the result over
to the secrecy setting only under some stringent hypotheses on the secrecy
logic that make it possible to use some necessary aspects of structurality.
We say that a set of formulas Φ ⊆ FmL(V ) is closed under a substi-
tution σ or that it is σ-invariant if σ(Φ) ⊆ Φ.
Suppose that S = 〈L,`S〉 is a deductive system and S = 〈FmL(V ),K,
B, S〉 is an S-secrecy logic. Define
ES = {φ(p, q, ~r) : φ(p, p, ~r) ∈ B}.
If the two variables p, q ∈ V are such that the substitution σp→q, mapping
q to p and leaving all other variables fixed, is an S-substitution, then,
by Proposition 2.4, ES is a safe theory. The same holds in case B is
σp→q-invariant. Moreover, although the analog of Lemma 1.1.2 of [12] does
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not hold in general, it may be shown that it does under some additional
conditions.
Lemma 4.1. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. Suppose σp→q is an S-substitution
or that B is σp→q-invariant.
1. If e is an S-substitution or B is e-invariant, respectively, and
σp→q(ep) = σp→q(eq), then ES is closed under e.
2. If 〈p, q〉 ∈ Ω(S), then 〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩS(ES).
Proof.
1. Suppose σp→q(e(p)) = σp→q(e(q)). Let φ ∈ ES. Then σp→q(φ) ∈ B,
by the definition of ES. By easy induction on the complexity of
φ, we can see that σp→q(e(φ)) = σp→q(e(σp→q(φ))). Thus, by the
invariance of B, we get that σp→q(e(σp→q(φ))) ∈ B. Therefore, by
the equality above, σp→q(e(φ)) ∈ B, showing that e(φ) ∈ ES. Thus,
ES is e-invariant.
2. We have σp→q(σp→r(φ)) = σp→q(σq→r(φ)), for every formula φ. There-
fore, σp→q(σp→r(φ)) ∈ B iff σp→q(σq→r(φ)) ∈ B, showing that
σp→r(φ) ∈ ES iff σq→r(φ) ∈ ES. This shows that 〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩS(ES)
and, since, by hypothesis 〈p, q〉 ∈ Ω(S), we get, by Proposition 3.7,
that 〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩS(ES).

Using Lemma 4.1, we may now prove that, under some conditions on
the secrecy logic under consideration, protoalgebraicity of the secrecy logic
is equivalent to the existence of an implication system relative to the logic.
This theorem forms an analog of Theorem 1.1.3 of [12], characterizing pro-
toalgebraic deductive systems in terms of the existence of implication sys-
tems.
Theorem 4.2. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. Assume that p, q are such that,
for all φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), the substitution σφ→p,ψ→q, that sends p to φ and
q to ψ and leaves all other variables fixed, and the substitution σ, that
fixes p and sends every other variable to q, are S-substitutions and that
〈p, q〉 ∈ Ω(S). Then, the following are equivalent:
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1. S is protoalgebraic;
2. q ∈ CS({p} ∪ ES);
3. There exists a set P (p, q) ⊆ FmL(V ) in the two variables p, q, such
that P (p, p) ⊆ B and q ∈ CS({p} ∪ P (p, q)).
Proof.
(1→ 2): By Lemma 4.1.2, we get that 〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩS(ES). Thus, by protoalge-
braicity and Theorem 3.6, 〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩS(CS({p} ∪ES)). Therefore, by
the compatibility property, we get q ∈ CS({p} ∪ES).
(2→ 3): Let P (p, q) = σ(ES). Then, σp→q(σ(p)) = p = σp→q(σ(q)), whence,
by Lemma 4.1.1, ES is σ-invariant, showing that P (p, q) ⊆ ES.
Therefore P (p, p) ⊆ B. Since σ is assumed to be an S-substitution,
we obtain, by Part 1 of Proposition 2.7, that q ∈ CS({p} ∪ P (p, q)).
(3→ 1): Let φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), T ∈ STh
>S and 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ ΩS(T ). Then, by the
congruence property, for all δ ∈ P (p, q), 〈δ(φ, φ), δ(φ,ψ)〉 ∈ ΩS(T ).
But, by hypothesis and the fact that σφ→p,ψ→q is an S-substitution,
we get that δ(φ, φ) ∈ B ⊆ T , whence, by compatibility, P (φ,ψ) ⊆
T . Once more, by hypothesis and the fact that σφ→p,ψ→q is an S-
substitution, we get that ψ ∈ CS({φ} ∪ P (φ,ψ)) ⊆ CS(T ∪ {φ}). By
symmetry, we obtain T, φ a`S T, ψ and S is protoalgebraic.

Although Proposition 4.2 provides a characterization of protoalgebraic-
ity for an S-secrecy logic, it is not very satisfactory, since the hypotheses
are rather strict. For instance, if p or q are in either B or S, then the
assumption that, for all φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), the substitutions σφ→p,ψ→q are S-
substitutions forces B or S, respectively, to be FmL(V ). In the first case,
the secrecy logic has the single safe theory FmL(V ) and, in the second,
the only safe theory is ∅, if S does not have theorems, and there is no safe
theory, otherwise. Thus in either case, the hypotheses lead into a trivial
secrecy logic in some sense. However, under less stringent hypotheses, it
might not be possible to do much better, given the wide variety of secrecy
logics that might be obtained by varying the knowledge and browsable
theories and the secrecy set of the logic.
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.5 Leibniz Operator on Secrecy Structures
The natural models for secrecy logics, according to the model theory of first-
order logic, are the secrecy structures that were introduced in [19]. Several
of the universal algebraic and categorical properties of their classes were
considered. In this section we review the definition and define the Leib-
niz congruence of a secrecy matrix, which consists of a secrecy structure
together with a secrecy filter on the structure. We show that protoalge-
braicity of secrecy logics may be characterized by the monotonicity of a
Leibniz operator on the secrecy filters of an appropriately chosen subclass
of the class of all secrecy structures.
Definition 5.1. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system. An S-secrecy
structure A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 is a quadruple consisting of
1. An L-algebra A = 〈A,LA〉;
2. Two S-filters KA, BA on A, such that BA ⊆ KA;
3. A subset SA ⊆ KA, such that SA ∩BA = ∅.
The S-filters KA and BA are referred to as the knowledge and browsable
filter, respectively, and SA as the secrecy set of the S-secrecy structure
A.
Secrecy interpretations correspond to algebra homomorphisms from the
free formula algebra to a given algebra that map the theories and the secrecy
set of a given secrecy logic into the corresponding filters and secrecy set of
a secrecy structure with underlying algebra the given algebra.
Definition 5.2. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system,S = 〈FmL(V ),
K,B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic and A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 an S-secrecy struc-
ture. A secrecy interpretation h : S → A is an L-homomorphism
h : FmL(V )→ A, such that h(K) ⊆ KA, h(B) ⊆ BA and h(S) ⊆ SA.
A secrecy interpretation h is called strict if
K = h−1(KA), B = h
−1(BA), S = h
−1(SA).
It is called surjective if h is surjective.
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Notice that a secrecy interpretation is a special case of a secrecy ho-
momorphism, as defined in [19]. The same holds for strict and surjective
secrecy interpretations. They form, respectively, special cases of strict and
surjective secrecy homomorphisms between S-secrecy structures.
For arbitrary S-secrecy structures, safe sets are subsets of their domain,
that contain the browsable filter and are disjoint from the secrecy set.
Definition 5.3. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and A =
〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 an S-secrecy structure. A subset F ⊆ A is called safe if
BA ⊆ F and F ∩ SA = ∅.
Based on this notion, the notion of a secrecy filter or S-filter on a
secrecy structure may be defined. These are safe sets that happen to be
SS-filters on the underlying algebra of the secrecy structure.
Definition 5.4. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system, S = 〈FmL(V ),
K,B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic and A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 an S-secrecy struc-
ture. A secrecy filter or an S-filter on A is a safe set F ⊆ A, such that,
for every Γ∪{φ} ⊆ FmL(V ), with Γ `S φ, and every secrecy interpretation
h : S→ A,
h(Γ) ⊆ F implies h(φ) ∈ F.
We denote by FiS(A) the collection of all S-filters on A and by Fi
>
S(A) the
same collection augmented by A.
Note that, although, in general, A is not a safe set, it does satisfy
the extra condition for being an S-filter on A. Safe matrices and secrecy
matrices are pairs consisting of a secrecy structure together with a safe set
and a secrecy filter, respectively:
Definition 5.5. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and A =
〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 an S-secrecy structure. A safe matrix on A is a pair
A = 〈A, F 〉, where F is a safe set of A.
If, in addition, S = 〈FmL(V ),K,B, S〉 is an S-secrecy logic, a safe
matrix A = 〈A, F 〉 on A is said to be a secrecy matrix or an S-matrix
if F is an S-filter on A.
Given two secrecy matrices 〈A, F 〉 and 〈B, G〉, a secrecy matrix ho-
momorphism h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉 is a secrecy homomorphism h : A → B,
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such that h(F ) ⊆ G. It is said to be a strict secrecy matrix homomor-
phism if h : A → B is strict and, in addition, F = h−1(G).
Given an S-secrecy structure A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉, we call a congru-
ence θ on A a safe congruence or a secrecy congruence if it is com-
patible with each of KA, BA, SA.
Recall that, given an algebra homomorphism h : A → B, its kernel
Ker(h) is the set of all pairs 〈a, b〉 ∈ A2, such that h(a) = h(b). In the fol-
lowing lemma, it is shown that the kernel of a strict matrix homomorphism
is a safe congruence on the domain that is compatible with the secrecy filter
of the matrix.
Lemma 5.6. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S = 〈FmL(V ),
K,B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. Let, also A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉, B =
〈B,KB, BB, SB〉 be two S-secrecy structures and F,G two S-filters on A
and B, respectively. If h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉 is a strict matrix homomor-
phism, then Ker(h) is a safe congruence on A that is compatible with F .
Proof. It is clear, since h : A→ B is an algebra homomorphism, that
Ker(h) is a congruence on A. We must show that it is compatible with
KA, BA, SA and F . All these may be shown similarly, whence we only
show in detail compatibility with KA. If 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Ker(h) and a1 ∈ KA,
then h(a2) = h(a1) ∈ KB, whence a2 ∈ h
−1(KB) = KA. Thus, Ker(h) is
compatible with KA. 
It may be shown, exactly as in the case of S-secrecy logics, that given
an S-secrecy structure A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉, there exists a largest safe
congruence on A. It will be denoted by Ω(A) and called the Leibniz
congruence of A. Moreover, given a safe matrix A = 〈A, F 〉 on A, there
exists a largest safe congruence on A that is compatible with F . It will
be called the Leibniz congruence associated with F and denoted by
ΩA(F ). It is clear that ΩA is an operator from the collection of safe matrices
on A to the collection of safe congruences on A.
The following lemma establishes an analog of a well-known result from
the theory of deductive systems and logical matrices. It is well-known that
the inverse image of a logical filter on an algebra under a homomorphism
from the algebra of formulas into the algebra is a theory of the logic. The
same holds for secrecy logics and secrecy structures as long as one restricts
to secrecy interpretations rather than arbitrary homomorphisms.
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Lemma 5.7. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system, S = 〈FmL(V ),K,
B,S〉 an S-secrecy logic and A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 an S-secrecy structure.
For every S-filter F on A and every S-interpretation h : S→ A, h−1(F )
is an S-theory.
Proof. Suppose that h−1(F ) `S φ, for some φ ∈ FmL(V ). Then, since
F is an S-filter, h is an S-interpretation and h(h−1(F )) ⊆ F , we must
have h(φ) ∈ F , i.e., φ ∈ h−1(F ). This shows that h−1(F ) ∈ STh>S. 
Another result that carries over to the secrecy setting from the theory
of abstract algebraic logic, provided, once more, that we restrict attention
to secrecy interpretations, is the one asserting the commutativity of the
Leibniz operator with inverse strict surjective homomorphisms.
Lemma 5.8. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system, S = 〈FmL(V ),K,
B,S〉 an S-secrecy logic and A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 an S-secrecy structure.
For every S-filter F on A and every surjective strict S-interpretation h :
S→ A, h−1(ΩA(F )) = ΩS(h
−1(F )).
Proof. First, note that, by Lemma 5.7, the set h−1(F ) is an S-theory,
whence it makes sense to compute the quantity ΩS(h
−1(F )). To see that
h−1(ΩA(F )) ⊆ ΩS(h
−1(F )), it suffices to show that h−1(ΩA(F )) is a con-
gruence compatible with h−1(F ). That it is a congruence on FmL(V )
(given that ΩA(F ) is a congruence on A) is well-known from universal al-
gebra. If 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈ h−1(ΩA(F )) and φ ∈ h
−1(F ), then 〈h(φ), h(ψ)〉 ∈ ΩA(F )
and h(φ) ∈ F , whence, by compatibility, h(ψ) ∈ F , showing that ψ ∈
h−1(F ). Thus, h−1(ΩA(F )) is compatible with h
−1(F ). This shows that
h−1(ΩA(F )) ⊆ ΩS(h
−1(F )).
For the reverse inclusion, assume that φ,ψ ∈ FmL(V ), such that 〈φ,ψ〉 ∈
ΩS(h
−1(F )). Let G ∈ {KA, BA, SA, F}, δ(x, ~y) ∈ FmL(V ) and ~χ
′ ∈ A|~y|.
Then, we have
δ(h(φ), ~χ′) ∈ F iff δ(h(φ), h|~y|(~χ)) ∈ F, for some ~χ ∈ FmL(V )
|~y|
iff h(δ(φ, ~χ)) ∈ F
iff δ(φ, ~χ) ∈ h−1(F )
iff δ(ψ, ~χ) ∈ h−1(F )
iff h(δ(ψ, ~χ)) ∈ F
iff δ(h(ψ), h|~y|(~χ)) ∈ F
iff δ(h(φ), ~χ′) ∈ F,
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whence 〈h(φ), h(ψ)〉 ∈ Ω(A) ∩ ΩA(F ) = ΩA(F ). Thus, h(ΩS(h
−1(F ))) ⊆
ΩA(F ), showing that ΩS(h
−1(F )) ⊆ h−1(ΩA(F )). 
Finally, the following is an analog (only partial, since it does not in-
clude all secrecy structures) of a well-known transfer property, that holds
for protoalgebraic deductive systems, stating that a deductive system S is
protoalgebraic if and only if the Leibniz operator on every algebra A is
monotone on the lattice of all S-filters on A.
Theorem 5.9. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. Then S is protoalgebraic iff,
for every S-secrecy structure A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉, for which there exists
at least one strict surjective secrecy homomorphism h : S → A, ΩA is
monotone on Fi>
S
A.
Proof. Suppose that S is protoalgebraic. Let A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉 be
an S-secrecy structure, such that, there exists a strict surjective secrecy ho-
momorphism h : S→ A, and F,G ∈ Fi>SA, with F ⊆ G. Then, by Lemma
5.7, h−1(F ), h−1(G) ∈ STh>S, such that h−1(F ) ⊆ h−1(G). Thus, by pro-
toalgebraicity and Theorem 3.6, ΩS(h
−1(F )) ⊆ ΩS(h
−1(G)), whence, by
Lemma 5.8, h−1(ΩA(F )) ⊆ h
−1(ΩA(G)). Therefore, since h is surjective,
we get that ΩA(F ) ⊆ ΩA(G). Note the crucial role that the existence of the
strict surjective secrecy homomorphism h played in this part of the proof.
If, conversely, for every S-secrecy structure A, for which there exists a
strict surjective secrecy homomorphism h : S → A, ΩA is monotone on
Fi>
S
A, then, in particular, for the S-secrecy logic S, viewed as an S-secrecy
structure, we have that ΩS is monotone on STh
>S, showing that S is
protoalgebraic. 
In the sequel, the class of all S-secrecy structures A = 〈A,KA, BA, SA〉,
for which there exists at least one strict surjective secrecy homomorphism
h : S → A will be denoted by HSS(S). This is the class of those struc-
tures for which, by Theorem 5.9 one may guarantee monotonicity of ΩA on
Fi>SA provided that S is protoalgebraic. The notation HSS is suggested by
“Homomorphic images under Srict surjective Secrecy homomorphisms”.
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.6 The Correspondence Property
In this final section of the paper, we present an analog of the well-known
correspondence property as a means of providing yet another characteriza-
tion of protoalgebraicity of secrecy logics. Recall that, a given deductive
system S = 〈L,`S〉 has the correspondence property if, for every strict
homomorphism h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉 between two S-matrices and every
S-filter H of 〈A, F 〉, i.e., such that F ⊆ H, it holds that H = h−1(h(H)).
(See Definition 1.1.7 of [12].) In Theorem 1.1.8 of [12], it is shown that a
deductive system is protoalgebraic if and only if it has the correspondence
property (see also [8]). In Definition 6.1, an analog of the correspondence
property, suitable for secrecy logics, is introduced and the section concludes
with Theorem 6.5, where it is shown that protoalgebraicity of secrecy logics
is equivalent to having this modified notion of the correspondence property.
Definition 6.1. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. Consider the collection ModS =
{〈A, F 〉 : A ∈ HSS(S) and F ∈ FiSA}. The S-secrecy logic S has the
correspondence property if, for all 〈A, F 〉, 〈B, G〉 ∈ModS, every strict
secrecy homomorphism h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉 and all S-filters F ′ on A, with
F ⊆ F ′, it holds that F ′ = h−1(h(F ′)). The collection of all S-filters F ′ on
A, such that F ⊆ F ′ will be denoted by FiS〈A, F 〉.
Our goal in this section is to relate protoalgebraicity of a secrecy logic
with the correspondence property. We start by proving that monotonicity
of the secrecy Leibniz operator on all secrecy structures in HSSS implies
that S has the correspondence property.
Lemma 6.2. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S = 〈FmL(V ),
K,B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. Suppose that, for every S-secrecy structure
A ∈ HSSS, ΩA is monotone on Fi
>
S
A. Then S has the correspondence
property.
Proof. Let 〈A, F 〉, 〈B, G〉 beS-secrecy matrices inModS, h : 〈A, F 〉 →
〈B, G〉 a strict S-matrix homomorphism and F ′ ∈ FiS〈A, F 〉. It is obvious
that F ′ ⊆ h−1(h(F ′)). To see that the reverse inclusion also holds, assume
that a ∈ h−1(h(F ′)). Then, h(a) ∈ h(F ′), whence, there exists a′ ∈ F ′, such
that h(a) = h(a′). This shows that 〈a, a′〉 ∈ Ker(h), which, by Lemma 5.6
is a safe congruence on A compatible with F . Thus, using the hypothesis,
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we conclude that 〈a, a′〉 ∈ ΩA(F ) ⊆ ΩA(F
′). Therefore, by compatibility,
since a′ ∈ F ′, we get that a ∈ F ′. 
The next step involves showing that the correspondence property in-
duces an isomorphism between the partially ordered sets of filters of any
two secrecy matrices in ModS related by a strict surjective matrix homo-
morphism.
Lemma 6.3. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S = 〈FmL(V ),
K,B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. If S has the correspondence property, then, for
all 〈A, F 〉, 〈B, G〉 ∈ModS and every surjective strict S-matrix homomor-
phism h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉, the mapping h, defined by F ′ 7→ h(F ′) is an
isomorphism between FiS(〈A, F 〉) and FiS(〈B, G〉).
Proof. It is easy to see that, since F ′ = h−1(h(F ′)) and F ′ is an S-
filter on A, h(F ′) is an S-filter on B. Thus, h : FiS〈A, F 〉 → FiS〈B, G〉 is
well defined. It is also a bijection. If h(F ′) = h(F ′′), then h−1(h(F ′)) =
h−1(h(F ′′)), which gives F ′ = F ′′, showing that h is injective. If G′ ∈
FiS〈B, G〉, then h
−1(G′) ∈ FiS〈A, F 〉 and h(h
−1(G′)) = G′ because h
is surjective. Thus h is also surjective. Finally, it is trivially inclusion-
preserving and, if h(F ′) ⊆ h(F ′′), then h−1(h(F ′)) ⊆ h−1(h(F ′′)), showing
that F ′ ⊆ F ′′. 
Finally, to complete the cycle, we show that, if, for all 〈A, F 〉, 〈B, G〉 ∈
ModS and every surjective strict S-matrix homomorphism h : 〈A, F 〉 →
〈B, G〉, h, as defined in Lemma 6.3, is an isomorphism, then the secrecy
logic S is protoalgebraic.
Lemma 6.4. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and S = 〈FmL(V ),
K,B, S〉 an S-secrecy logic. If, for all 〈A, F 〉, 〈B, G〉 ∈ ModS and every
surjective strict S-matrix homomorphism h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉, the mapping
h : F ′ 7→ h(F ′) is an isomorphism between FiS(〈A, F 〉) and FiS(〈B, G〉),
then S is protoalgebraic.
Proof. Assume that T, T ′ ∈ STh>S, such that T ⊆ T ′. Then
h : 〈S, T 〉 → 〈S/ΩS(T ), T/ΩS(T )〉
is a strict surjective homomorphism, whence, since T ′ ∈ FiS〈S, T 〉, we get
that h(T ′) ∈ FiS〈S/ΩS(T ), T/ΩS(T )〉, and, therefore, that h
−1(h(T ′)) ∈
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FiS〈S, T 〉. Since h is surjective, h(T
′) = h(h−1(h(T ′))), whence T ′ =
h−1(h(T ′)). This shows that ΩS(T ) is compatible with T
′. Thus ΩS(T ) ⊆
ΩS(T
′). Therefore, by Theorem 3.6, S is protoalgebraic. 
If Lemmas 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are put together, the following characteriza-
tion of protoalgebraicity of an S-secrecy logic can be obtained.
Theorem 6.5. Let S = 〈L,`S〉 be a deductive system and let S =
〈FmL(V ),K, B, S〉 be an S-secrecy logic. Then, the following are equiva-
lent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) For all A ∈ HSSS, ΩA is monotone on FiSA;
(iii) S has the correspondence property;
(iv) For every 〈A, F 〉, 〈B, G〉 ∈ ModS and every surjective strict S-
matrix homomorphism h : 〈A, F 〉 → 〈B, G〉, the mapping h : F ′ 7→
h(F ′) is an isomorphism between FiS(〈A, F 〉) and FiS(〈B, G〉).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) is given by Theorem 5.9. (ii) ⇒ (iii) is given by
Lemma 6.2. (iii) ⇒ (iv) is given by Lemma 6.3. Finally, (iv) ⇒ (i) is
given by Lemma 6.4.

We close the section by discussing a question that is open for further
investigation. In [19], various constructions of universal algebraic and cat-
egorical character, including a detailed study of the formation of subdirect
products, were carried out for the class of S-secrecy structures endowed
with secrecy homomorphisms between them. In Theorem 1.3.7 of [12] (see
also [8]), on the other hand, Czelakowski proves that protoalgebraicity of
a deductive system is equivalent with its class of reduced matrices being
closed under subdirect products. Since the constructions of [19] could be
transferred with some care to the context of S-matrices, it would be an
interesting topic of investigation to find out whether it is possible to ex-
tend or modify Theorem 1.3.7 of Czelakowski to the setting of S-secrecy
logics to provide another characterization of the notion of protoalgebraic
S-secrecy logic.
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